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CHAPTER - Introduction 
The recession of 2008 led to a deep economic, political and social crisis that caused 
social protests against the European establishment, affecting the course of European integration 
and enabling the rise of Eurosceptic and Europhobe parties across the continent. This social 
discontent, along with other variables brought about a new political scenario, modified European 
party competition and encouraged the emergence of new political parties capable of capitalising 
electoral results around new issues in different Member States (MS).  
In addition, the progressive Europeanization of the economic policy and the dramatic 
social consequences of the European political decisions taken by the national governments at 
European level during the recession, have been accompanied by an overall drop of the public 
support of the European institutions and its capability to positively solve the situation, leading 
the EU to serious political and legitimacy crises. 
A priori, the data from the last European elections and many national elections seems to 
point out in one direction: political mutation and polarization. Moreover, extreme populisms 
(both right and left-wing) appear to be in a boom phase. These new populist parties are often 
Eurosceptic or even Europhobe, and have emerged in many MS, including traditional pro-
European countries such as Spain, where public support for the EU has suffered a considerable 
decline in the last years. Spain has seen an authentic earthquake in its political landscape with the 
irruption of two new political forces, Podemos (en. for “We can”) and Ciudadanos (en. for 
“Citizens”). However, we still do not know much about the nature of these new political parties 
and their positions regarding the EU, due their recent institutionalization and the difficulty of 
classifying them into the traditional party typologies. Recent studies have revised the scepticism 
in Spanish parties and citizens, but they were carried out previous to the emergence of the new 
political parties and to the crisis. The ENEC report1 is already a good attempt to assess the 
impact the crisis has had in domestic political elite attitudes towards the EU, but it is before the 
elections where Podemos and Ciudadanos gained parliamentary representation. 
																																								 																				
1 A	research	project	which	main	goal	is	to	assess	the	effects	of	the	political	and	economic	crisis	over	the	elites	in	
eleven	MS,	among	them	Spain. 
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Furthermore, it is crucial to study this phenomenon because these parties might play an 
important role in the future of European integration in the country, since in Spain there is a large 
percentage of the population that is not very well informed about EU politics, and public opinion 
on EU issues largely depends on the ideological preferences for domestic elites. In fact, many 
studies and surveys, such as the Eurobarometer, have overestimated the Europeanism of the 
Spanish citizens.  Nonetheless, some authors like Barreiro and Sanchez-Cuenta (2001) have 
already pointed this ‘faulty Europeanism’, given that there is a high percentage of people that 
lack interest and knowledge about the EU and could be mobilized through political competition. 
Besides, it is also important to examine the attitudes of domestic elites towards the EU project 
and compare them to those of the citizens, because political elites are part of the EU political 
elite and its study can provide an insight about the prospects of the gap between political elite 
and the general population, and more broadly about the future of EU integration in Spain. 
Domestic elites, together with media and other social elites, are one of the main mediators 
between the European institutions and the citizens from the MS. During years, they were the 
bases of the ‘permissive consensus’ that helped to build the EU (Lindberg and Scheingold, 1971, 
Haller, 2008). Nowadays, they are also at the centre of the politicization process of European 
affairs and in the development of what some authors have called the ‘constraining dissensus’ 
(Hooghe and Marks, 2009) that constrains the integration process in the last years. Therefore, the 
analysis of the opinions of the national elites towards the EU is fundamental to understand the 
process of legitimation of European integration, as well as its future. 
This study aims to analyse to what extent the appearance of populist parties in Spain, 
namely their positions and attitudes towards the EU, have favoured the rise of Euroscepticism, 
and to see whether there is a link between their appearance of these parties and the highest peaks 
of Euroscepticism. The literature review will focus firstly on a brief discussion of the democratic 
deficit of the EU to understand the roots of Euroscepticism and party scepticism, and secondly, 
on the theory regarding new political parties and their typologies.  This chapter will be followed 
by a presentation on the methodology used for the study and by an analysis of the evolution of 
the public opinion and the attitudes of traditional political elite attitudes towards the EU in order 
to have a picture of the Euroscepticism and party scepticism in Spain before the appearance of 
the new parties. The study will then continue with the assessment of the voting patterns of the 
new political parties in the European Parliament (EP) and their discourse towards the EU. 
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Finally, we will conclude with a reflection of the impact of these parties on citizens’ support to 
the EU in Spain. 
CHAPTER II: Methodology 
This research will try to assess whether the appearance of new political parties in Spain 
has had an influence or modified somehow citizens’ negatives attitudes towards the EU in the 
last few years. To that end, the following hypothesis, the new political parties have not favoured 
substantially the rise of Euroscepticism among public opinion in Spain is laid out to drive the 
assessment and narrow the study. 	
Building upon quantitative and qualitative research to demonstrate the hypothesis, the 
investigation firstly develops a theoretical framework of reference that includes relevant aspects 
for the study: the main reasons behind the so-called democratic deficit of the EU and the 
Eurosceptic attitudes of citizens and political parties, as well as the theories on the emergence of 
new parties. Secondly, a brief overview of the Spanish party competition will be presented to 
explore the changes of the Spanish party system after the euro crisis. This chapter will also 
contain an assessment of the evolution of the attitudes of the citizens and the traditional political 
elites of the EU.  Thirdly, the following chapter will provide a brief content analysis of some 
leaders’ speeches and political manifestos of the two biggest new political parties in Spain, 
Podemos and Ciudadanos, to see whether they contain Eurosceptic attitudes.  Through a content 
analysis of their electoral programs for the General Spanish elections of December 2015 and 
June 2016, as well as their manifestos for the European elections of 2014 the study will identify 
and examine their positions towards the EU. Furthermore, the voting behaviour of the new 
political parties in the EP in these three years of mandate will be analysed in order to see whether 
their visions and claims on the EU match their positions on a number of issues.	
The methodology will use both, quantitative and qualitative techniques, quantitative to 
assess the evolution of the opinion of the citizens and the traditional political elites on the 
European project since the beginning of the crisis, and qualitative to analyse the content of the 
political manifestos and positions of the new political parties towards the EU. For the first 
purpose, public opinion surveys and the ENEC report, will be used. Namely, various primary 
sources of quantitative data will be used for the study; the Standard Eurobarometer’s from the 
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years 2007 to 2016 from Eurostat, the Statistical Agency of the European Commission, national 
surveys made by the Spanish research company Metroscopia, data from the Spanish Ministry of 
Home Affairs and the Pew Research Survey on Euroscepticism beyond the Brexit. As for the 
content analysis, the study aims to identify which are the most relevant issues addressed in the 
electoral programs of Podemos and Ciudadanos and whether the proposals contained in them 
show political party commitment to approach the EU through existing structures (status quo 
position), through the need for fundamental reforms but not a complete break with the current 
structures (reformist position) or to through a radical transformation of the structures and power 
(transforming position) (Hopwood, Mellor and O’Brien, 2005) to determine to what extent they 
can be considered Eurosceptic. Therefore, the content analysis in the current research is 
established as a systematic process of interpretation of the meaning of the proposals of the 
political manifestos in the framework of the political communication. The analysis is carried out 
through a qualitative assessment that allows to draw conclusions about the positions defended by 
the two political parties in relation to the EU and its terms.	
Lastly, some conclusions will be drawn in the light of the research question and 
hypothesis. It is worth mentioning that the answer to the research question will not aim at giving 
an affirmative or negative answer but at elaborating on a reflection of the current and future 
influence of Podemos and Ciudadanos on the Spanish public opinion on the European project in 
Spain.	
CHAPTER III- Literature review 
Spain celebrated last year the 30th anniversary of the accession of the country to the 
European Economic Community (EEC) in a context of an overall drop of the Spanish public 
support to the EU and the trust in its capability to positively solve the economic and political 
crisis.  At the same time, in line with other MS, there has been a rise of populist parties in Spain 
that challenge the current functioning of the EU. To understand the causes of popular and party 
Euroscepticism, this is, the distrust and discontent in the EU and its institutions, we will briefly 
revise the literature regarding the democratic deficit of the EU and the debate on their motives.	
In second place, since these new political actors have been able to enter and succeed in 
the electoral competition and its stances could be influencing and modifying Spanish public 
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opinion with regard to the EU, as it is laid out in the research question, the Spanish case should 
be framed in a broader theoretical framework in order to understand the circumstances that have 
enabled the appearance of new political parties and a new political scenario of political 
competition, as well as identify its particularities and common grounds with the existing 
literature regarding new political parties and their typologies. In this sense, the conceptualization 
of the theory regarding new political parties will also try to identify potential causes of 
Eurosceptic and anti-establishment attitudes since the rise of Euroscepticism could be linked to 
the appearance of new issues that enable new dimensions of party competition.	
The debate of the democratic deficit of the EU: Euroscepticism and party skepticism 
The debate of the so-called democratic deficit of the EU is not new, the longstanding discussions 
upon the motives of the problem started already with the signature of the Treaty of Maastricht. 
However, the alarming decline of trust in European institutions and the rise of Euroscepticism, 
aggravated by the crises of 2008, the return to nationalist politics that has had its maximum 
expression and in the referendum over British membership y in Brexit revives the discussion of 
the legitimacy of the EU.	
A first school of thought trying to explain the causes of democratic deficit was born after 
the ratification of the Treaty of Maastricht, which considered that the EU had a problem of input 
legitimacy: the EU would not be democratic because the decision-making processes are not open 
to the participation of the citizens through democratic institutions such as the ones at national 
level. However, this deficit could be solved by strengthening the powers of the EP and by 
politicizing European elections to create a true debate between European parties like the ones 
taking place in the national elections of the MS (Hix, 2008). This approach has been proven to be 
weak since successive treaty changes have strengthened the powers of the EP in significance and 
scope and European citizens still do not seem to see the EP as they see their national Parliaments. 	
A second school of thought developed in the 90s considers that the EU has a problem of 
output legitimacy. This approach based on the efficiency of the policies delivered by the EU 
argues that the EU would be legitimized if the institutions solved the economic problems of the 
European citizens producing tangible results, that is, in terms of its ability to provide public 
goods and resolve people’s problems (Moravscik, 2002; Scharpf, 1999). This utilitarian approach 
has gained relevance and weight during the crisis, since the recession has been accompanied by 
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an overall fall of the public opinion in favor of the EU. Looking at the evolution of the European 
public opinion until now, it seems that during times of economic prosperity Europeans tend to 
increase their support to the European project, as opposed to over difficult economic times. 
Nevertheless, this has not been always the case and therefore the theory does not apply entirely 
to the Spanish case since at the beginning of 2000s, when practically all European economies 
lived years of prosperity, the figures of support to the EU were substantially different from those 
achieved in the past. For instance, only 57% of the citizens considered the membership of the EU 
as positive for their country in the 2000s, as opposed to 71% in 1991 (Eurobarometer, 2007:80), 
revealing that besides the utilitarian support the so-called “affective or diffuse support” 
according to which citizens will provide support to the EU “as an emotional response to some of 
the vague ideals embodied in the notion of European unity” is also relevant (Lindberg and 
Scheingold, 1970: 40). 	
This idea is directly related to the third school of thought explaining the causes of the 
democratic deficit suffered by the EU, the communitarian, which advocates that the problem of 
legitimacy stems from the absence of a “European demos”. A demos is “a group of people, the 
majority of whom feel sufficiently connected to each other to voluntarily commit to a democratic 
discourse and to a related decision-making process” (Cederman 2001: 224). Therefore, the lack 
of social European identity prevents EU citizens from identifying themselves with a European 
political system.  In this sense, without the previous existence of this demos, democracy cannot 
exist (Weiler, 1999: 337; Weiler, Haltern and Mayer, 1995). 	
AN area of literature regarding the causes of the democratic deficit of the EU that gained 
popularity several years ago and that authors like Follesdal and Hix (2006) have well 
summarized in five main claims, affirms that firstly, the decisions of the EU are taken mainly by 
executive actors (the Ministers of the MS in the Council and the Commissioners) that are not 
scrutinized by parliamentary national control. In addition, the executive cannot be chosen by 
citizens, lacking an explicit electoral mandate. This system has been appropriately labelled as 
‘executive elitism’ (Ruivo et al., 2012). Secondly, the EP is too weak. The increase of its powers 
has not sufficiently compensated for the loss of parliamentary national control and the citizens 
are not as well connected to the EP as they are to their national parliaments. Thirdly, there are no 
real "European elections" because citizens cannot vote about EU policies, except in referenda on 
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EU accession or the reform of the agreements. Fourthly, the EU is too distant and technocratic 
and not very understandable for EU citizens. Lastly, the EU has suffered a ‘policy drift’, 
adopting policies that lack the support of most the citizens in many MS or even in most of them. 
Furthermore, it seems that the EU is biased towards neoliberal policies that only seek to develop 
and consolidate the single market (Scharpf, 1999), whereas the social policies are in the hands of 
national authorities constrained by an increasing budgetary control in the Eurozone (Ruivo & De 
Almeida, 2012). The EU project would be a project of the center-right and the European business 
elites to expand their markets (Bellamy, 2010). 	
Vivien A. Schmidt (2013) has rightly conceptualized the problem by opposing the 
existence of a system of "politics without policies" at national level to another of "policies 
without politics" at the European level. Schmidt defines the European political system as a 
system of "policies without politics" in the sense that it is a system that produces a big amount of 
outputs without an ex-ante political debate. Important political decisions, especially economic 
decisions, are taken without a previous political deliberation beyond national interests. On the 
other hand, at the national level, the opposite phenomenon takes place: the system has long 
political debates but does not have the tools to turn this debate into effective public policies since 
it is constrained by European structures.	
Whatever the causes of the democratic deficit are, what is relevant for this study is its 
outcome, the rise of Euroscepticism among citizens and political parties can be understood as a 
group of political attitudes expressing contingent or absolute opposition to the process of 
European integration (Taggart, 1998: 365). Depending on the level of opposition to the European 
project, this Euroscepticism can be classified as hard Euroscepticism – when these attitudes are 
totally contrary to the membership of the EU – and soft Euroscepticism – when it does not reject 
the existence of the EU but it is contrary to the transference of further competences or certain 
aspects of the integration process (Szcezerbiak y Taggart, 2008).	
The nature of the EU political system has favored mainstream parties to the detriment of 
political competition like the one that takes place at a national level, since the system is based on 
consensual decision-making (Bellamy, 2010). The result of squeezing the opposition is that it is 
eventually balanced by an enhanced rejection to the polity (Mair 2007: 7-12). Thus, the rise of 
radical parties with a strong anti-European stance since the beginning of the financial crisis 
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might be an indicator of Mair’s prediction. One could argue that this growing Euroscepticism is 
the expression of a deep general malaise with European democracies. Peter Mair (2006), for 
instance links the rise of Euroscepticism with a movement of a deeper political skepticism in 
Europe that affects national politics, making it difficult to distinguish between the causes that 
relate to the European integration and those of a national nature. 	
The European political landscape and the national political scene are intrinsically linked, 
so when we analyze the growing Euroscepticism, we must take into account that the current 
democratic crisis not only affects the EU, but also national democracies that undergo deep 
transformations in their respective political situations. The democratic crisis of the EU is the 
reflection of the internal democratic crisis in the different MSs. Despite the fact that the 
consequences might be different, the causes of the discontent with European democracies are the 
same or very similar and are related to the loss of power of the democratic institutions before the 
political and economic globalization (Mair, 2013). Hence, to get a better understanding of these 
dynamics and the rise of Euroscepticism, we should analyze changes in national political arenas. 
For this purpose, the study will engage with the literature regarding political parties, namely 
regarding party competition and the emergence of the new political parties.	
CHAPTER IV Changes in the European party systems and emergence of new parties.	
Political parties are at the very heart of our democracies. They are considered by scholars 
as necessary tools of modern political representation and described as essential agents of 
mobilization (Lipset & Rokkan, 1967) and channels of expression whose main duty is, above all, 
to represent the people and express their demands (Sartori, 2005:64). They enable citizens’ 
voices to be listened to during policy-making processes. Political parties recruit candidates, 
mobilize electoral support, set the political agendas and form the governments, among other 
functions (Montero y Gunther, 2007: 21). 	
With regard to their typologies, the one presented by Richard Gunther and Larry 
Diamond (2003) is very useful since their classification gathers all the previous classifications, 
from classics like Duverger (1954) or Neuman (1956) to more contemporary ones like 
Kirchheimer (1966), Panebianco (1988) and Katz & Mair (1995).	
According to Gunther and Diamond (2003) we can classify political parties in five 
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different categories from which three are relevant for the study: mass-based parties, electoralist 
parties or catch-all. Mass-based parties were relevant over the XX century and characterized by 
a solid militant base that makes economic contributions to the party, and which is united by a 
group of beliefs that are often extended to other areas of their social life. They usually maintain 
strong links with external organizations such as trade unions, religious institutions and the media. 
This type of parties gave progressively way to electoralist parties or catch-all, parties without a 
marked ideological tendency because they seek to increase their votes as much as possible. They 
have a central position because they try to maximize their possibilities to win the elections, 
making them simple electoral ‘machines’. The emergence and success of this type of parties 
especially over mass-based parties can be framed in what some scholars have called ‘the end of 
the ideology (Bell, 1960). The ideology as a group of ideas and beliefs is inefficient in a moment 
when the global hegemony of an economic, political and cultural model makes daily problems 
immune to the left-right cleavage. Ideology works as a mere ‘cash machine’ (Bell, 1960: 85) and 
as an instrument of canalization of citizens demands and political mobilization. The last 
category, called a movement party, lacks a clearly defined programmatic line despite having a 
notable ideological component. They are purely contemporary and are framed in anti-
establishment tendencies from both the right and the left wing. They advocate for cross-cutting 
policies and horizontal relations without hierarchies and without a powerful decision center. 
They are inserted in a post-materialist context that explains the elimination of the figure of the 
militant in the traditional sense, given that they are open parties where everyone who wishes to 
participate is welcomed (Gunther and Diamond, 2003: 188-189).	
Regarding the party system, it can be described as the result of the interaction (political 
competition) of the political units that make it up. The system is influenced and determined by 
the nature of the parties that participate in it and, at the same time, the model of party system 
influences the nature and behavior of the political units (Bartolini; 1988: 218-219). Bartolini 
proposes three different approaches when analysing party systems, the genetic, the morphologic 
and the competitive approach (Bartolini, 1988: 219).	
In the genetic approach, based on cleavages, Rokkan and Lipset (1967) identified four 
historic fractures around which political parties have traditionally positioned themselves and that 
still play a relevant role nowadays. These cleavages that structure European party systems are 
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centre/periphery (nationalisms), State/Church, urban/rural and land/industry. Today, we can 
include new cleavages such as European integration (intergovernmentalism vs. 
supranationalism). In fact, when analyzing why some political parties hold Eurosceptic attitudes, 
while some authors have highlighted the importance of the historic left-right axis (Hooge & 
Marks, 2002; Gabel & Hix, 2002), others have suggested that ideology does not play a relevant 
role (Szmolka, 1999).  Nonetheless, for authors such as Szczerbiak and Taggart, the parties´ 
positions within their party systems would condition their attitudes towards the EU. Mainstream 
parties tend to be less skeptical than peripheral parties. Moreover, national contexts would also 
have a relevant role in the expression of Euroscepticism (Brinegar, Jolly & Kitschelt, 2004; Ruiz 
Jiménez and Egea de Haro (2007).	
The morphological approach focuses on the shape and size to analyze the competitive 
interaction of the political parties. According to the dispersion and concentration of power in the 
system we can classify political party systems as a single party system, bipartisan or multiparty. 
(Bartolini, 1988: 224).  This is a very useful and extended model that has been further developed 
by Sartori (2005), who included multiparty subtypes according to the number of parties and 
distance between them: moderate multiparty system, polarized and prevailing party.	
There are three major theoretical approaches that aim to explain the variation of the 
support of the political elites to the EU at both the collective and the individual level: the 
cultural, the institutional and the ideological approach. The cultural approach, which can be split 
into macro and micro-cultural theories, puts the emphasis on the exogenous factors. In this sense, 
attitudes would be driven by deeply stable rooted beliefs (Mishler and Rose, 2001). On the 
contrary, the institutional approach, which can also be broken down into micro and macro 
institutional theories, highlights that support is endogenous to the political process, meaning that 
this support will depend on the institutional action. Thus, support for the EU would be unstable 
and variable compared to the previous approach (Thomassen and Schmitt, 1999). Finally, the 
ideological approach claims that support for the EU’s political system will be based on self-
positioning on the ideological scale. According to Steenbergen and Marks (2004), the left-right 
cleavage divided into free/regulated market issues spills over into support for the EU political 
system.  However, mainstream literature, advocates that this divide would be mainly a divide 
between radical and mainstream ideological positions. Mainstream parties would tend to be more 
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supportive of the EU whereas radical parties will be more likely to hold Eurosceptic stances 
(Conti, 2013:175) 
The current political and democratic crisis has had a great impact on European political 
party systems, but are the causes of this phenomenon exogenous or endogenous? Mair (2015) 
focuses on the endogenous factors. As democratic systems consolidated after World War II, the 
social gap that appeared between the elite and the rest of the population implied a new “abyss” or 
“vacuum” between the political class and the citizens, increasingly deprived of their sovereignty. 
Mair tries to explain the motives of disaffection or the high degree of indifference for politics in 
general and for political parties in particular. The ´vacuum´ of western democracies will respond 
to the progressive weakening of the experiences of the third democratic wave: the ruling elites 
will distance themselves while voters abstain from politics. All this is a result of a new 
phenomenon, the progressive delegitimization of the democratic systems.	
New political parties come up, as well as other parties rebranding themselves, to respond 
to the need of rescuing “issues” that are claims emerged from the problems experienced by the 
society in a particular moment. Before the distancing of the political establishment, various 
authors consider how these negative attitudes towards political parties and elites caused the 
emergence of new political party systems.	
Lago and Martinez, in a study carried out specifically in respect of the Spanish 
experience, note that the conditions for the emergence of new parties require new incentives that 
compensate the electoral costs. The appearance of new parties will depend on two sets of 
variables: institutional (electoral system, number of seats in the parliament and sociological 
(cleavages) and the electoral market (market failures in the electoral market). Moreover, when 
the political parties exhibit behavior contrary to what was expected from them, the voter might 
react in two different ways, abstaining or voting for “non-established parties”, which can benefit 
from this disaffection, especially if they use anti-establishment discourses and offer a “different 
way of doing politics” (Lago y Martínez, 2011: 7). In this context, a new party can emerge when 
citizens’ demands are not being fulfilled by the usual political parties and be successful in the 
electoral competition when their proposals address these demands. On the contrary, ideology 
would not allow fast changes in the traditional political parties benefiting and ballasting them at 
the same time: benefiting from this situation thanks to cognitive “shortcuts” but harming them 
14	
	
due to their inability to adapt to the new situation until they have lost various elections (Lago & 
Martínez, 2011: 8). The fewer years since their founding election, the greater the chances of a 
successful entrance into the party system (Lago & Martínez; 2011: 16-17).	
CHAPTER IV - Euroscepticism in a pro-European country: from the enthusiasm of 
accession to populism. 
Since Spain’s return to democracy in 1978, the European integration process has gone hand in 
hand with the national project itself. However, the traditional pro-European attitudes can no 
longer be taken for granted. Although support to the EU by the mainstream parties has remained 
unchanged after the crisis, the decline of citizens´ support to the European institutions has 
experienced a significant drop. The EU was blamed for austerity and badly seen by the northern 
stereotypes regarding peripheral and debtor countries and not as an instrument to provide greater 
prosperity and security. At the same time, two new political parties have emerged in Spain 
changing the Spanish political party system significantly which might have important political 
implications for the EU. 
Party competition in Spain  
The general elections of 2015 put an end to the two-party system that had governed Spain 
for the last three decades. Two new parties broke into scene, challenging the dominant position 
of the two traditional mainstream parties Partido Socialista Obrero Espanol (PSOE, en. for 
Spanish Socialist Workers’ party) and Partido Popular (PP, en. for People’s party). 
Since the launch of democracy in 1977, Spain has had different political party systems. 
The first model did not have any predominant party, responding to a morphologic structure with 
a limited pluralism or moderate multi-party system upon the classic left-right axis. However, 
from 1982 to 1993 PSOE managed to win three consecutive elections with absolute majority and 
controlled the executive for 21 years. The PP only started challenging PSOE in the 1990s, when 
the new leader José María Aznar changed the ideological profile of the party by shifting it to the 
centre (Orriols & Lavezzolo 2008). Therefore, giving way to a prevailing party system. In 1993, 
the country consolidates an imperfect bipartisan model with the alternation of PSOE and PP. 
Traditionally, these parties were the outcome of left-right divisions but in the recent years both 
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parties are close to the definition of Catch all parties because they have blurred and soften their 
ideological and programmatic differences to maximize their possibilities to win the elections.  
The Spanish two-party system was defined as imperfect because had other state-wide and 
the non-statewide parties such as Izquierda Unida (IU), the former communist party with 
national presence that stands to the left of PSOE, and other regional parties organized around the 
cleavage centre/periphery, such as Convergencia i Unio (CIU) and Partido Nacionalista Vasco 
(PNV) that completed the party system. In the last few years also another party founded by the 
former socialist Rosa Díez and which refused to locate itself within the traditional left-right 
divide, had appeared in the national scene, Union, Progreso y Democracia (UPyD)2. The 
aforementioned regional parties do not have a relevant parliamentary presence but act as hinge 
parties in the bipartisan model, since due to their key strategic position have supported the large 
political parties in punctual moments. During the two-party system period, the nationalist parties 
supported the formation of the governments of PSOE in 1993 and 2004 and PP’s in 1996 
governments.  
This system was in place for more than two decades, until the elections of 2015 when 
Spain underwent an authentic political earthquake with the irruption of two new political parties, 
Podemos and Ciudadanos. For the first time in democracy the most voted party was not able to 
form a government. Thus far, the two largest political parties, PSOE and PP, were able to govern 
without the need of coalitions thanks to the absolute majority or the simple majority achieved in 
the second round of the investiture vote.  PP and PSOE used to concentrate an average of 80% of 
the votes. The highest pick of concentration of the two parties took place in 2008 with 83% of 
the votes, far away of the current 55,69%3. The Spanish political party system was now subject 
of a  
Source: newspaper El Pais 
high volatility. This election was also the end of four years of absolute majority. The 
elections of 2015 gave birth to a totally different political scenario with the significant loss of 
																																								 																				
2	UPYD	was	national	party	that	obtained	representation	in	the	general	elections	of	2008	and	2011	with	one	and	
five	seats	respectively,	disappearing	from	the	Parliament	in	the	elections	of	2015.	
3	According	to	the	data	provided	by	the	Spanish	Ministry	of	Home	Affairs	
http://www.infoelectoral.mir.es/infoelectoral/min/busquedaAvanzadaAction.html?codTipoEleccion=2&vuelta=1&i
sHome=1&codPeriodo=200803	
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votes of the mainstream parties, the disappearance of IU, and CIU of the parliament, and the 
emergence of two new parties, Podemos and Ciudadanos which shared a democratic 
regeneration agenda, but had a radically different ideological profile. The political party system 
had turned into a moderate multiparty one. Before there were two big political parties and now 
there are four, 5 parties with electoral relevance and four with parliamentary weight 
Due to the incapacity to reach an agreement and form a coalition, elections were held 
again six months after, in June 2016, where one of the biggest parties, PP, recovered some 
support. This recovery, was to a large extent, the result of the tiredness of the citizens of the 
political situation and their fear of the consequences of ungovernability for the country. The 
political blockage also had an impact in the turnout that was slightly lower in June of 2016. 
Podemos obtained 69 seats in the general elections of December 2015, adding two more seats in 
2016. On the contrary, Ciudadanos suffered a significant decline considering its size, passing 
from the 40 seats to 32.  PSOE underwent a similar trend and lost 5 deputes, whereas PP 
recovered increasing its number of seats from 123 to 137, although the party was still far from 
the absolute majority. 
Podemos formed a coalition with IU, Unidos Podemos (UP) to run for this general 
election to try to advance PSOE from the its left side, catching the most volatile voters in favour 
of the so-called “government of the change”. However, this attempt did to materialized and as 
already pointed, the electorate voted for the PP, making the coalition to lose some votes.  
Since then, and after a failed investiture of the President Mariano Rajoy, the PP governs 
with a tight majority in the national Parliament thanks to the votes in favour of PP, Ciudadanos 
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and Coalición Canaria and to the abstention of PSOE which recently elected Pedro Sanchez as 
its leader after troubled discussions and great divisions within the party. Spanish politics are in 
shambles and likely to enhance polarization. Podemos has called for a no-confidence vote 
against President Rajoy due to the party's accusations in numerous corruption scandals. 
Meanwhile Catalan independentists are trying to hold a referendum on Cataluña´s independence 
in October while Spain is claiming Gibraltar back, redline on the Brexit negotiations. 
Party Euroscepticism 
Spain has been considered as a pro-European country since its accession to the European 
Community (EC) in 1985. In fact, it has been the only country where all political parties 
supported the accession, including the Communist party (Sanchez-Cuenca 2001; Richards 1999, 
pp. 178–179; Alvarez Miranda 1996). The demise of Franco that ruled the country under a 
dictatorship during more than 40 years, was followed by an overall agreement of all political 
forces to join the community, result of the desire of freedom, democracy and modernity 
associated to the EC. EC membership was perceived by the political elites as necessary step for 
socioeconomic modernization to succeed in the transition to a new political regime and 
overcome the ghosts of dictatorship. All the political parties involved in the Spanish transition 
considered the accession as a must to overcome international isolation and undergo the required 
economic reforms to consolidate democracy in the country. 
Spain finally joined the EC the 12th of June of 1985 after several attempts. The first 
approach was already made in 1962 to access the European Economic Community (EEC). 
Nonetheless, this request was rejected due to the authoritarian regime in power.  A preferential 
tariff agreement was reached with the EEC in 1970 but until Franco’s death, the way for 
accession was closed. The first democratic government lead by the socialist party submitted the 
request for accession in 1977, process that finished in 1985, when the accession treaty was 
ratified after years of arduous negotiations, mostly related to agriculture and fishery policies. The 
difficulty of the negotiations caused criticism from some political parties but was with the launch 
of the single market and European Monetary Union (EMU), accompanied by serious economic 
problems in the early 90s, when some negative attitudes appeared among national elites. 
Nonetheless, the economic costs of the membership were perceived as unavoidable in the short 
run and the benefits in the future were expected to be higher than the costs. Moreover, Spanish 
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parties have exhibit strong and stable positive attitudes towards the EU over time, only IU among 
nation-wide parties, has shown some negative attitudes due to the lack of the social dimension in 
the integration process.  
The findings of the ENEC report, have pointed that traditional domestic elites’ attitudes 
towards the EU barely vary with the crisis. The study, that carried out interviews to 81 deputes of 
the mandate between 2011 and 2015 but it is presented in comparative perspective with the data 
of the IntUNE4 Elites Survey of 2007 and 2009, shows that Spain is the second country where its 
elites express higher levels of identification with the EU (95,1 %). The crisis has not involved 
significant changes in this pattern. Furthermore, the overall support for the integration process of 
the Spanish elites in a scale of 10 points is 8 points, higher than the average of the sample (6.9 
points) and 97,9% of the deputies think that Spain has benefited from EU’s membership. It is 
worth noting that only half of the members of the parliament consider that EU decisions do not 
take enough into account Spanish interests, although this figure is still higher than the average 
and it has been modified significantly over the crisis.  
The deputies’ trust in the institutions is also higher than the average of the European 
countries that participated in the survey.  Such trust is 7 points for the EP, 6.6 points for the 
Commission and 6.1 points for the Council. The support for the EP has been strengthened since 
2007 and remained stable for the other two institutions. In addition, 63,8 % of the deputies are 
‘satisfied or very satisfied’ with the functioning of the democracy at the European level, again 
above the average of the sample. Lastly, it is interesting to note that when asked about how better 
address the effects of the crisis the Spanish deputies prefer EU intervention than a coordinated 
action of the national government's (37,5 % and 34 ,2 % respectively). Overall, it can be said that 
Spanish traditional elites are optimistic regarding the future of the EU since 85% thought that in 
10 years the EU will be more politically integrated. 
In addition, according to a study of Votewatch after the Brexit on the positions MEPs on 
the future of Europe “Spanish politicians have a common position in regard to the future of the 
European Union, despite the internal disagreements on national politics. In fact, there are no 
																																								 																				
4	The	survey	IntUne	was	a	European	study	carried	out	in	18	counties,	among	them	Spain,	that	aimed	at	exploring	
the	factors	that	determine	the	European	and	national	identity.	It	also	investigated	how	citizens	and	political	elites	
perceived	the	EU	and	the	benefits	of	membership.	
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parties advocating for the exit of the EU and they all supported Juncker to continue as the 
president of the Commission”. The study highlights that all the Spanish parties voted for 
relaunching the European project. What is more, Podemos was the only far left party that voted 
in favour of the resolution. Nonetheless, its support was mild regarding the vote on the revision 
of the treaties. The party was the only party among those which make up the European United 
Left/Nordic Green left (GUE/NGL) group and which emitted a negative vote, that abstained. It is 
worth mentioning that although Podemos and IU united forces and candidatures in the last 
General Elections and integrate the same parliamentary group in the EP, the usually vote very 
differently in the EP. IU, in line with the rest of the group, disapproved the lack of self-criticism 
of the institution voting against the resolution. 
PP, PSOE and Ciudadanos supported the resolution mainly focused on the revision of the 
treaties and the need to respect the will of the UK citizens but against the permanence of 
Scotland and Northern Ireland in the EU. In fact, the differences between Spanish parties were 
more accentuated regarding this issue. Podemos, United Left, Basque Nationalist Party, Catalan 
Left, Initiative for Catalonia-Greens and other nationalist parties emitted a positive vote on the 
permanence of Northern Ireland in the EU. 
Public opinion 
Citizens attitudes, however, followed a different trend. The crisis of legitimacy has been 
particularly serious in Spain. The country went from being in April 2008, together with Slovenia, 
the MS where more people supported and trusted the EU (66 per cent of the people interviewed), 
to be the most Eurosceptic country in June 2014, where only 16% demonstrated trust in the EU 
against a percentage of 79% that was affirming that tended to distrust it, overcoming even 
Greece, which was leading the ranking of Euroscepticism from May 2011.  
The positive opinion about the EU plunged to 32 % in autumn 2010 after the European 
intervention that took place in May, and despite the slight recovery in the spring of 2011, fell 
again in November after the constitutional reform to adapt the Spanish Constitution to the deficit 
and public debt limits established by the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Economic 
governance of the EMU. In the Eurobarometer of Autumn 2011, the image of the EU drops for 
the first time under 30% and in the spring of 2012, the number of Spanish with a negative 
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opinion of the EU surpassed for the first time those with a positive view since the 
accession.  Since then, the positive image has progressively deteriorated up to 20% in the spring 
of 2013 and reaching its lower peak in June 2014 with a drop of 26 points in seven years. 
According to the Eurobarometer, at the beginning of 2007, 57% of the Spanish citizens trusted 
the EU and in autumn 2016 only 34% did it. Nonetheless, it is interesting to note that also the 
image of national institutions followed the same trend, steadily falling from 2007 to 2014.  
Source: 
Standard Eurobarometer no86, 2016 
From 2014, and according to the last available Eurobarometer of November 2016, the 
information seems to indicate a certain trend of recovery. Although both, the European Union 
and the national parliaments of every MS continue generating more distrust that confidence 
between European citizens. The data of the last two years only improves the historical minimums 
reached in 2014 and the last Eurobarometer indicates that respondents are dissatisfied with the 
way democracy works in Spain and the EU with 66% and 54% respectively. 
Nowadays, according to the last Eurobarometer positive opinions of the EU’s image 
outweigh negative opinions (+10 points). Although, it is remarkable that Spain has the highest 
percentage of neutral opinions (51%) among the rest of MS.  In fact, when asked how the EU 
works, a majority of respondents in Spain (52%) say that they do not know. These figures are 
very significant since it has been claimed that Spaniards have been among the Europeans that 
have shown more levels of support to the EU, above EU averages.  Nonetheless, as we already 
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pointed, these percentages are exaggerated since support has been overestimated and there is also 
a large percentage of citizens that lack knowledge and defined ideas about the EU due to 
disinterest or ignorance. Although, this cannot be automatically defined as Euroscepticism. 
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In any case, 57% of the Spaniards feel optimistic with regard to the future of the EU, 7 
points above that the rest of European citizens. Furthermore, despite the deterioration of the 
image of the EU, as well as the trust in its institutions in Spain in the last years, the percentage of 
those who think that EU membership has been beneficial for the country is still majority 
according to a survey carried out by Metroscopia. From 80% in 2009 in the beginning of the 
crisis to a 65% in 2014 (the worst year for institutional trust in general) and 70% in 2015.  This 
opinion was shared by the electorate of the four main parties. The lowest percentage belonged to 
the potential voters of Podemos (58%), the only electorate for which, to a large extent, being part 
of the EU had not involved a great help for Spain to face the economic crisis. 
An interesting study of the Pew Research Centre carried out in 10 countries that account 
for 80% of the EU-28 population and 82% of the EU’s GDP, before the vote on the referendum 
on Brexit about the recovery of citizens trust in the EU pointed that European public opinions are 
sharply divided along partisan lines on many European issues. Furthermore, this division is not a 
simple matter of left versus right in each society. In Spain people on the right (59%) are less 
likely than those on the left (35%) to distrust the EU by a margin of 24 percentage points. These 
ideological differences spill over large partisan divides on various issues, only 32% of Podemos 
party adherents favour the EU. The EU’s management of the economic crisis is a huge source of 
disaffection with the institution in Spain. About 65% of the Spanish citizens disapprove the way 
the Brussels has handle the economic crisis. 
Looking at the data of the evolution of the Spanish public opinion on the EU from 2007 
to 2016 we can affirm that the utilitarian support in Spain is a strong determinant of the citizens 
grating support for the European project. Nonetheless, the ‘affective support’ also plays an 
important role in Spaniards attitudes towards the EU. The management of the economic crisis 
has caused a notable decrease of the affective and utilitarian support. Spanish citizens have now 
a much less positive image of the Union than 7 years ago, they trust less its institutions. 
It must be taken into account that Spain plunged in recession from 2009, with a financial 
national system with serious problems and with levels of unemployment that had grown from 8,2 
% in 2007 to 24,6% in 2012, year when the country accepted a program of financial assistance to 
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rescue part of his bank sector, ballasted by the consequences of the crisis but mostly due to the 
real-estate bubble that had taken place during the decade of 2000. In addition, as in other 
European countries, a series of harsh austerity measures were implemented under the flag of 
‘recommendation’ by the Troika as preconditions for emergency loans and other forms of 
assistance (Fominaya & Cox 2013). This situation led to public protests emerged before and after 
the announcement of the constitutional reform that introduced a cap on the deficit in August. A 
number of corruption scandals that affected mainly PP, as well as other parties and institutions, 
fuelled the public protests and between January and February 2013 public concern about 
corruption doubled (CIS, 2013). The percentage of citizens that considered ‘corruption and 
fraud’ to be one of the most significant problems moved from 18 to 40 per cent in just one 
month. Citizens’ concerns about corruption peaked in November 2014 with 64% of respondents 
placing ‘corruption and fraud’ as one of the main problems of the country. 
The combination of these factors caused a political crisis. The lack of confidence and 
trust in political actors and institutions increased among citizens. Political disaffection had 
already started rising during the last years of Zapatero’s government but reached its peak in 2013 
with 40% (0 value in a scale of 10) of the electorate distrusting political parties and one third of 
the respondents considering them and politicians two of the main problems of the country (CIS, 
2013). This discontent had an impact on the EP elections, where the PP and PSOE obtained the 
worst results since the first European elections, 26% and 23% respectively whereas the 
newcomers had significant results. 
CHAPTER V- Filling the vacuum, Podemos and ciudadanos. 
Podemos was born as a party in 2014, a few months before the European elections, where 
it obtained 1.3 million votes (8% of the vote share) and five MEPs. Ciudadanos, launched in 
2006 to fight against the “mandatory nationalism” imposed by the independentist catalan parties, 
also ran for the European elections, getting two MEPs. Podemos integrates the European 
Parliamentary group of the European United left/ Nordic Green left (GUE/NGL) whereas 
Ciudadanos joined the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe (ALDE). Their 
ideological differences are clear. Podemos holds a firm criticism of the European establishment 
and their austerity policies. They are reformists since they believe in Europe but not as it stands 
today. Therefore, they can be framed as soft Eurosceptic since they do not wish to withdraw 
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from the EU but they want to change certain aspects, such as the focus on the neoliberal model 
and the single market in favour of a Europe with greater focus on social policies. On the 
contrary, Ciudadanos do not questions the terms of the integration process. In fact, the party 
defines itself as pro-European. For them ‘the main goal of European integration is the 
achievement of the United States of Europe’5. 
Ciudadanos decided to run in other regions in the local elections of 2007, and after the 
party presented a political manifesto for the general elections of 2008 where they barely reached 
0´18% of the votes. In 2009, the party tried to form an unsuccessful coalition with the party 
UPyD to run for the European elections. Moreover, the party presented its candidature to the EP 
with the Eurosceptic platform Libertas, an act that has been recognised as a mistake by its leader 
Albert Rivera. With the Catalan referendum on independence entering the political agenda, the 
party managed to get an remarkable result in the regional elections of September 2015 (17.9 % 
of the vote and 25 seats), becoming the main opposition party in the Catalan parliament. Since 
2015, the party, born to fill the vacuum of those that reject identarian nationalist policies in 
Cataluña, has developed a strategy to expand nationally through the alliance with various 
political parties and independent candidates, changing its initial name in Catalan, Ciutadans, for 
the current Ciudadanos. A decade ago, the party was launched to fill a political space that did not 
respond to nationalist divisions but the evolution of the political framework enabled it to jump to 
the national competition under the flag of the political regeneration.  
Podemos was founded in January 2014 by a group of left-wing university lecturers from 
Madrid’s Complutense university, with the aim of ‘converting indignation into political change’ 
(Pavía, Bodoque & Martín, 2015: 1) and is a party that it is built around the main claims of the 
movement 15-M6. Podemos “managed to pick up on a widespread social unease with a simple 
and effective message against corruption, the privileges of traditional politicians, precarious 
																																								 																				
5	Retrieved	from	the	official	website	of	the	party		https://www.ciudadanos-cs.org/nuestros-valores	
6	Also	called	Movimiento	de	los	indignados	(en.	for	outraged	ones),	was	a	civil	movement	that	arose	immediately	
after	the	demonstrations	of	May	15,	2011,	summoned	by	diverse	groups	such	as	Democracia	Real	YA	(en.	for	Real	
Democracy	NOW)	or	Juventud	Sin	Futuro	(en.	for	Youth	Without	a	Future),	after	forty	persons	decided	to	camp	
spontaneously	in	the	square	of	Puerta	del	Sol	(Madrid).	This	event	lead	to	a	series	of	pacific	protests	across	the	
country,	aiming	at	of	promoting	a	more	participative	democracy	far	from	the	bipartisanship	make	up	by	PSOE-PP	
and	of	the	control	of	banks	and	corporations.	Among	their	demands	there	were	also	"	an	authentic	division	of	
power	"	and	other	measures	with	the	intention	of	improving	the	democratic	system.	The	movement	protested	
about	welfare	cuts,	the	high	rate	of	unemployment	and	political	corruption.	
http://www.movimiento15m.org/2013/07/como-surgio-el-movimiento-15m.html	
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work conditions and unemployment” (Rodríguez-Aguilera de Prat, 2015: 57). In fact, the motto 
‘they do not represent us’ and ‘Real Democracy Now’ is understood by their leaders as an 
opportunity to win citizens over and respond to the social demands claiming democratic 
regeneration. This demand goes beyond the left-right cleavage. In fact, Podemos called for a new 
cleavage, people/establishment. This is the reason why the party can be classified as a movement 
party and inserted in a postmaterialist framework since, as Inglehart (1977) stated, they are 
characterized for a strong transversal anti-elite discourse linked to the discourse of social 
movements, mainly portrayed as in opposition to the economic-political elites, reinterpreting of 
the traditional cleavage capital/work. However, the replacement of the left/right cleavage for 
above/below axis in an attempt to escape ideological labels, distance the party from the 
movement party typology and brings it closer to the catch all category. Podemos is today an 
institutionalized party that tries to maximize its possibilities in the polls. Therefore, the party can 
be classified as a hybrid of both types since it has elements of each category. 
Ciudadanos, more prone to facilitate coalitions first with PSOE in 2015 and with PP after 
the last elections also managed to be institutionalized and win a relevant area of the electoral 
market. The party jumped to the national level once it verified that the electoral market presented 
the same vacuums as the regional level.  The content of its discourse focuses more on the 
democratic regeneration and the battle against corruption than in anti-austerity claims. The pro-
European nature and the respect for the national and European establishment has made them 
‘firmly committed with fiscal stability and deficit goals set up by the European institutions’7. The 
ambiguity of their ideological positions and discourse aims to present the party as moderated, 
pragmatic and in a central position so as to get as many votes as possible. In this sense, 
Ciudadanos can be clearly classified as a catch-all party.  
The corruption is one of the most used terms by both Podemos and Ciudadanos. They are 
against the “traditional or conventional way of doing politics”. Nevertheless, this cannot be taken 
as the only explanation of the emergence and success of the new parties since, for instance, 
UPyD would have followed the same growing trend of the analysed parties. The appearance of 
new competitors in the party system was closed and stable before the crisis and it was only 
																																								 																				
7	Proposal	no.34.	350	soluciones	para	cambiar	España	a	mejor.	Electoral	Programme	of	Ciudadanos	for	the	General	
Elections	26th	June	2016.	
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viable when a vacuum opened up in the electoral market. The macroeconomic and social 
indicators also contributed to the necessary conditions for the emergence and success of the new 
parties. The disastrous unemployment figures, the austerity measures, the reduction of social 
rights, and the perception of a corrupted system facilitated the irruption of Podemos and 
Ciudadanos, parties that neglected left-right divisions in favour of a new dimension, the fracture 
between the people and the establishment.  
The populist discourse 
Podemos tends to use ‘plain and direct’ language, characterised by clear, blunt sentences 
and a limited vocabulary (Rodríguez-Aguilera de Prat, 2015: 58) (Fernández Riquelme 2015: 
26). In this context, one of the most notable features of Podemos’ discourse is the dichotomy 
between the ‘people’ and the so-called ‘casta’ used to refer to the corrupt minority which 
occupies positions of power without taking into account the interests of the ‘people’.  A majority 
who, therefore, find themselves without adequate representation (Bayon, 2015). For Iglesias, the 
‘casta’ also includes the worldwide financial elite, which in his view, are the real rulers of the 
world, and which he refers to as the ‘Wall Street Party’(Iglesias, 2014: 115-141). According to 
Iglesias, the so-called ‘Wall Street Party’ increasingly dominates both Spain and the European 
Union. The EU is depicted as dominated by the international ‘casta’, and is therefore portrayed 
as a corrupt entity which is no longer at the service of its citizens, but rather at the service of an 
international capitalist elite. Podemos has tended to describe the EU as dominated by a corrupt 
ruling class of Eurocrats and politicians, themselves forming part of the worldwide financial 
elite, which in Iglesias’ view are the real rulers of the world (Iglesias, 2014:115-141). According 
to Iglesias, ‘a Europe has been constructed which is not at the service of the citizens but at the 
service of the banks, including the German banks’ (Berlunes 2014). 
Ciudadanos, as mentioned before, holds an anti-independentist and Europeanist 
discourse. Their language moderated and pragmatic, yet ambiguous, while retaining a focus on 
democratic regeneration and the battle against corruption. Their rhetoric appeals to a rational 
change in contrast to the radical change proposed by Podemos. The party uses a liberal discourse 
based on the neoliberal formula of the ‘workfare’8. Like the welfare but mainly linked to two 
																																								 																				
8	According	to	Lodemel	and	Trickey	(2001),	the	workfare	would	be	based	on	a	series	of	measures	that	require	re-	
entering	the	labor	market	for	the	person	in	order	to	able	to	get	social	benefits.	In	this	sense,	it	is	emphasized	the	
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elements: employment and the nation. Nonetheless, we can also find some common features in 
the discourse of both parties. The discourse of one as much as the other has been focused in 
solving the social problems and demands of the citizens. The Populist formula comes from the 
distinction between dignified people and corrupted elites. Both Podemos and Ciudadanos call for 
a democratic regeneration of the political institutions and elites. 
While Podemos does not advocate a Spanish exit from the EU, it supports significant 
reform of the EU. Its position, thus, is very different from that put forward by ‘hard’ Eurosceptic 
parties such as UKIP or the Front National, which have supported their country's exit from the 
EU and tend to favour the collapse of the European integration project altogether. In fact, 
Podemos was the only Spanish party to actively take part in the Brexit campaign in the UK, with 
the participation of Pablo Bustinduy, the party’s international secretary, in the Labour Party’s 
pro-Remain campaign in Manchester (Riveiro, 2016). The party has argued that the Brexit 
decision should be a ‘wake-up’ call for the EU, and calls for significant democratisation of its 
institutions along with abandonment of austerity policies in favour of a social Europe.   
A brief content analysis of the political manifestos of both Spanish General elections of 
2015 and 2016, as well as the manifesto used for the European elections of 2014 confirms the 
features described above. The motto for the European campaign of Ciudadanos ‘The Union is 
the strength’ seemed designed specifically for the regional campaign to present the party as an 
alternative to Catalan nationalism, since at the beginning of the manifesto there is a statement 
directly related to it: ‘The Europeans and the Spanish are stronger together and we need to 
recover the eagerness to share a common project’. The manifesto contains a letter which is 
ambiguous and uses a vague language but that has a clear federalist orientation since it speaks 
about a ‘United States of Europe’ and affirms that ‘Joined economic, political and socially, the 
European Union would occupy the seventh position in the list of major countries, would be the 
third country for population and the first economy of the world’. The manifesto is 16 pages long 
and divided in 6 chapters, all starting with the word ‘Europe’. The chapters refer to a more 
democratic Europe, political and economic integration, a space of freedom, equality, security and 
justice, education and R&I, energy and the fight against poverty. The party wants a more 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
mandatory	nature	to	obtain	an	employment	to	be	able	to	perceive	some	type	of	social	benefit.	The	leitmotiv	of	
these	policies	of	the	welfare	to	work	advocates	that	the	employment	is	the	best	and	probably	the	only	route	to	
achieve	the	social	insertion,	and	prevent	poverty.	
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politically and economically integrated Europe. In fact in the manifesto they mention again a 
‘United States of Europe’, a Ministry for finance of the EU, a bigger EU budget, a reform of the 
institutions (including the unification of President of the Commission and the President of the 
Council) and a less bureaucratic Europe, among other proposals. 
Podemos does not have an introductory speech in its 36 pages long manifesto which is 
split in 6 chapters. All chapters start with the word ‘recover’ or ‘conquer’ and refer to the 
economy, freedom, equality, fraternity, sovereignty and the environment. One of the main points 
of the manifesto called for the deletion of the constitutional reform to introduce a cap on the 
public debt and deficit that was agreed by PP and PSOE and pushed from Europe. The party also 
claims the recovery of strategic sectors of the economy such as energy, the transformation of the 
ECB, the creation of a European agency of rating that avoids fluctuations and persecutes fiscal 
fraud, a fiscal system adapted to the needs of the MSs, a bigger investment in R&D and a 
reduction of the military costs.  It is worth mentioning that many of the claims of the movement 
15M were taken on board, such as the limitation of the expenses of the electoral campaigns, the 
defence of the rights of expression and association, as well as legislation that gathers LGBT 
rights. Finally, there are a set of European measures addressed to the protection and solidarity of 
the member states, through the defence of the language, the development of the rural world and 
the protection of the environment and species. 
Podemos states in the manifesto for the general elections of 2015 that ‘Spain does not 
need more cuts but to abandon definitely austerity policies to reduce the unemployment and the 
inequality and transform the economy’9. This argument affirms that ‘the main problem is the 
inadequate fiscal framework of the Eurozone that has aggravated the crisis and its consequences 
for the population, delaying the recovery and prioritizing unrealistic deficit goals that submit the 
whole European economy to deflation’10.  
As it can be seen in the tables below, gathering the electoral proposals of the General 
Elections of 2015 and 2016, the electoral program of Ciudadanos changed substantially between 
elections, from having four proposals regarding the EU to twelve. Moreover, these proposals 
																																								 																				
9	Retreived	from	the	website	of	the	party	in	https://podemos.info/espan%CC%83a-no-necesita-mas-recortes-sino-
abandonar-definitivamente-la-austeridad-para-reducir-el-desempleo-y-la-desigualdad-y-trasformar-la-economia/	
10	Ibid.	
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have now their own chapter which is called ‘more and a better Europe’.  The topics of the 
electoral programme of June 2016 are completely different from those elaborated for the 
elections of 2015 and address ‘hot’ issues such as the refugee crisis, the signature of TTIP or the 
fight of terrorism.  The proposals are quite ambiguous and mainly focus on the reinforcement of 
defence and foreign policies and its institutions.  The push for deeper integration is also present 
among their proposals. Podemos, however, maintained the number of proposals and topics 
between elections. Both electoral programs are centred in economic and social reforms, 
particularly economic reforms. Nonetheless, it is also worth noting the inclusion of proposals to 
democratize decision-making in the EU and a proposal on the energy field on the electoral 
program prepared for the elections of 2016. According to the classification described before, 
Podemos’ proposals contain reformist and transformational positions whereas the proposals of 
Ciudadanos show the party's commitment to approach the EU through existing structures (status 
quo position). 
As for the manifesto for the General elections of 2016, among other measures, Podemos 
wanted to drive the reform of the European institutions to make political and economic decisions 
more democratic in the Eurozone11. For Iglesias, ‘all the important decisions should be taken by 
institutions with democratic legitimacy’, implying ‘a simultaneous process of democratising 
European institutions but also of recovering sovereignty’ (Infolibre, 2016). In practice, the 
‘European United Left’ group in the EP, of which Podemos forms part, presented and voted for a 
series of amendments to the Commission’s 2017 work programme which would be in favour of 
abolishing the Lisbon Treaty and the Stability and Growth Pact. Literally, amendment 22 
requests ‘the convocation on the part of the European Council of an intergovernmental 
conference on the reversibility and repeal of the Treaties’ (El Chivato, 2016). The party has also 
expressed its wish to call for a European conference to restructure the public debt of the 
economies of the Eurozone12, the creation of a ‘Social Eurogroup’ to monitor social 
imbalances13, to increase funding for healthcare and education14 and the design of an alternative 
energy strategy of the European Commission15. 
																																								 																				
11	Proposal	no.85.	La	sonrisa	de	un	país.	Electoral	Programme	of	Podemos	for	the	General	Elections	26th	June	
2016.	
12	Ibid.,	Proposal	no.	86	
13	Ibid.,	Proposal	no.89	
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Proposals referring to the EU in the electoral program for the General Elections December 2015.	
PODEMOS	 CIUDADANOS	
• To reform substantially the Agreement of 
Stability and Growth and the Fiscal 
Agreement, eliminating the aim of budgetary 
balance and adapting the aims of debt and 
deficit. 
• Emission of Eurobonds.  
• Design of a European plan to eradicate poverty 
and exclusion; European unemployment 
benefits that complement the national one.  
• Reform of the statutes of the European Central 
Bank in order to include the objective of job 
creation. 
 
• Unification of the figures of 
the president of the 
Commission and of the 
European Council.  
• To reduce the number of 
commissioners (from the 28 
current ones to about 15).  
• To eradicate tax havens that 
still exist in Europe and 
tributary dumping.  
• Creation a European 
Treasury. 
 
Proposals referring to the EU in the electoral program for the General Elections June 2016.	
PODEMOS	 CIUDADANOS	
• Design of an alternative 
proposal to the Energetic 
Strategy of the European 
Commission. 
• Creation of a European agency 
of independent and public 
rating. 
• Impulse of a reform of the 
European institutions that 
democratizes political and 
economic decision-making in 
the Eurozone. 
• Call for a European conference 
of debt to discuss the 
coordinated restructuring of the 
national debts in the frame of 
the euro-zone. 
• Promotion of the reform of the 
statutes of the European 
Central Bank. 
• Support a deeper European integration at all 
levels: political, military, fiscal, monetary and 
social. 
• Defence of stronger European institution to 
carry out a true Foreign and Security Policy 
for the benefit of all. 
• Boosting intelligence and judicial cooperation 
with clear rules for the exchange of 
information and data protection to reinforce 
European agencies that fight against terrorism 
and organized crime. 
• Support of the High Representative for 
foreign affairs and security policy and the 
External Action Service as only 
representatives for the European foreign 
policy and accountable to the EP. 
• Creation of a Common, coherent and 
integrated European Defence and a common 
European defence army. 
• Support of a more ambitious Schengen space. 
																																								 																																							 																																							 																																							 																																			
14	Ibid.,	Proposal	104	
15	Ibid.,	Proposal	no.12	
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• Adoption of an immediate plan 
to eradicate poverty and 
children exclusion in the whole 
European territory. 
 
• Work for an authentic and transparent single 
labour market that favours quality 
employment and labour mobility. 
• Promote European initiatives against poverty 
and inequality. 
• Defence of a fair and solidary European 
solution to the refugee tragedy. 
• Foster a European migration policy that 
includes a common frontier control and 
reinforced FRONTEX to face irregular 
migration. 
• Reform of the regulation of the Spanish 
Parliament to make compulsory the report of 
the government before and after European 
councils. 
• Support the signature of the Transatlantic 
Trade Investment Partnership (TTIP) as long 
as it respects European legislation regarding 
social, labour and consumer protection, as 
well as the protection of the environment. 
 
Vote patterns of in the European Parliament	
Finally, in order to see what the implications of the ever-inconsistent Spanish political 
scene will be on the EU, we have examined how Podemos and Ciudadanos have behaved when 
being part of the EU decision-making since May 2014 to see where they really stand for. 
The Votewatch in-depth study on the voting and behaviour of the representatives of the Spanish 
parties in the EP from the European elections to the beginning of 2016 have shown that Podemos 
casted negative votes with regard to the finalisation of an economic and political union, EU 
economic policy coordination, grant powers to the ECB to impose sanctions, restoring monetary 
sovereignty, on the EU capital market union, cutting red tape, TTIP, reform of the EU Emissions 
Trading Scheme (ETS), greater EU support to Ukraine, consider sending arms to Ukraine, 
support of security over privacy and approval of Juncker's Commission. On the other hand, the 
party voted in favour of public spending over austerity, reshaping EU company law, food from 
cloned animals, refugee´s quotas, recognition of Palestine statehood and easy access to 
contraception and abortion. Lastly, abstained regarding a stronger EU tax policy and a bigger EU 
budget. Thus, the party emitted negative votes against mainly economic measures and the current 
European economic model whereas the positive votes revolved around various issues.	
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Ciudadanos voted in favour of all aforementioned measures except for restoring 
monetary sovereignty, supporting of public spending over budget discipline, and easy access to 
Contraceptives and abortion procedures. Interestingly, another recent survey of Votewatch 
pointed out that Ciudadanos has shifted to the right during the last months. There is an increased 
cooperation between the party and PP since they allied after the outcome of the general elections 
of 2016. Furthermore, Ciudadanos votes more often in line with PP than in line with its 
parliamentary group, ALDE. The matching rate between the two parties is 82%. The same trend 
is followed by the party at a national level. Differences with Podemos and PSOE are wide, 
though.  Podemos is also far from PP´s voter patterns (38%) and has the highest matching rate 
with IU (88%) and to a lesser extent with PSOE (57%).	
In summary, the study has revealed that Ciudadanos can be classified as a pro-european 
party since neither its proposals nor its voter behaviour at the EP show anti-European features. In 
fact, the majority of its proposals fall under the status quo category. Thus, without questioning 
the european establishment whereas many proposals of Podemos contain reformist and 
transformational positions. Moreover, the votes emitted by the party at EP match their approach 
to EU, framing it as a soft Eurosceptic party with a firm criticism of the European establishment 
but committed to the EU’s founding values.	
CHAPTER	VI	-	Conclusions	
The traditional political parties are suffering a decline in Spain. Since few years ago, 
there has been a rise of populist parties that are winning space in the electoral arena and weight 
in the national parliament, as well as the European Parliament where Euroscepticism is 
progressively growing. Likewise, social movements are gaining relevance, boosted by political 
disaffection and the crisis of legitimacy. Many citizens have opted for new or reinvented parties 
that go beyond the classic left/right axis, proposing new dimensions of political competition. 
This is the case in Spain where the party system has experienced a transition from a bipartisan 
party system to a moderate, multiparty one with the appearance of new political parties that 
respond to new issues and challenge the dominant position of traditional parties. Furthermore, 
there has been an increase of the volatility and the political fragmentation in the party system 
without precedent.	
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The crisis of legitimacy of the EU has been particularly serious in Spain. Although there 
seems to be a trend of recovery and currently the positive opinions of the citizens outweigh the 
negative views on the EU, there is still a large percentage of neutral opinions compared to other 
MSs. Therefore, Spanish support cannot be taken for granted any longer since not only the image 
of the EU has suffered a deterioration among the Spanish citizenship, the consensus between 
political parties about the future of the European integration has also been broken. Traditional 
parties continue having a positive opinion of the EU but as the assessment on the opinions and 
stances of the new political parties on the EU has shown, Podemos, which has now a 
considerable political weight in the Spanish parliament and in domestic politics, disagrees with 
the way democracy works in the EU. Furthermore, it questions various of its basic elements, 
such as the predominance of neoliberal policies over social claims or the benefits of the 
Eurozone. Thus, the party can be classified as soft Eurosceptic since it wants to change certain 
aspects of the European integration, but does not question the EU membership. On the contrary, 
Ciudadanos fully supports the EU and would like to go deeper in the process of European 
integration. The study did not identify anti-European features in the discourse and electoral 
manifestos of Ciudadanos. It rather points out that the party’s discourse aims at gaining ground 
to the traditional parties by blaming them for the corruption, while also claiming the need of 
democratic regeneration and of institutional reform to favour the unit and territorial integrity of 
Spain. As for Podemos, the study of the content of the political manifestos reveals that the anti-
austerity discourse and criticism of the functioning of the EU has been a constant claim of the 
party. Nevertheless, the commitment of the party with Europe seems undeniable despite all the 
discrepancies in the way the EU works, especially regarding economic and fiscal policy.	
Podemos and Ciudadanos might have had an influence in the negative attitudes of the 
Spanish citizens towards the EU, but their impact has not been substantial since they have not 
been the main reason driving the drop of the positive image of the EU among the public opinion. 
Other factors such as the power of the media and their treatment of the crisis might have 
contributed to frame the way citizens perceive Europe nowadays. Besides, the research 
undertaken seems to emphasise that the economic crisis and its consequences have contributed to 
aggravate the hidden problems that were already present in our democracies. As a matter of fact, 
the crisis intensified the feelings of disaffection and discontent with political parties as well as 
the functioning of democracy at EU and national levels, leading to claims for political 
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regeneration. It is interesting to note that Podemos appeared in 2014, the lowest peak of the 
citizens’ trust in the EU, but this fall of support also coincided with a high rate of unemployment, 
several corruption scandals and other economic problems in the country. Moreover, the study has 
pointed out that the distrust in political parties and political elites, as well as dissatisfaction with 
democracy and national institutions, grew in parallel with the rise of Euroscepticism in Spain.	
Last but not least, it could be argued that the appearance of Podemos and Ciudadanos is 
linked to the serious economic and political crisis that our country experienced since 
2008.  However, the extent and length of the crisis itself does not explain by itself the success of 
the parties, not even as a social and mediatic phenomenon without precedent in our recent 
democratic history. In forty years of democracy in Spain, there have been periods of economic 
and political crisis with various cases of corruption that barely altered the institutional stability 
nor modified substantially the structure of the party system. The new parties emerged to fill a 
vacuum in the electoral market that opened up during the crisis to respond to social claims that 
have been present for a while, but were accentuated by the crisis. Many have seen in this process 
of ‘filling the vacuum’ of the democratic space a mean to counteract the growing gap between 
citizens and political elites. Now, what remains to be seen is whether the new political parties 
will manage to narrow this gap. 
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